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THE LAST STAGE IN





The integrated bar is a system in which lawyers must enroll in a state
bar association before receiving a license to practice law. This is a pre-
condition that is unique to the legal profession. An integrated or manda-
tory bar exists today in a number of states. At present, integrated or
mandatory bars exist in thirty-six states and territories as well as the Dis-
trict of Columbia.2
Throughout this century, a conflict over this exceptional institution
has existed-a conflict that has been especially intense and enduring in
Wisconsin, This article examines the conflict over bar integration both
inside and outside Wisconsin's legal profession between 1934 and 1956.
Part II discusses the origins and the early years of the bar integration
movement. Part I details the legislative history of the issue in Wiscon-
sin between 1934 and 1943. Part IV examines the ultimate success of the
* Marquette University Law School.
1. I will use the term "integrated bar" to refer to membership in the state bar as a pre-
condition for being a licensed attorney. There are a number of examinations of the "unified"
or integrated bar movement. Two recent examples include Bradley A. Smith, The Limits of
Compulsory Professionalism How the Unified Bar Harms The Legal Profession, 22 FLA. ST.
L. REV. 35 (1994) and Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., The Integrated Bar and the Freedom of Non-
association-Continuing Siege, 63 NEB. L. REv. 30 (1984). The only book-length treatment
of the subject is presented in DAVID DAYTON MCKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR (1963).
2. This number was compiled in Ralph H. Brock, Giving Texas Lawyers Their Dues:
The State Bar's Liability Under Hudson and Keller For Political and Ideological Activities, 28
ST. MARY'S L. J. 47,48 n.3 (1996).
3. A basic introduction to the subject of the integrated bar in Wisconsin is presented in
PHILIP S. HABERMANN, A HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZED BAR IN WISCONSIN 38-52 (1986).
See also Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept Generalizing
from the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J 1 (1983) [hereinafter, The Incoherence
of the Unified Bar Concept]. See also, Sheldon W. Hoenig, Politics Of Bar Integration
(unpublished M.S. thesis, 1962). This article provides a useful account of relevant events and
interviews with a number of the participants.
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bar integration movement in the courts between 1943 and 1956. Finally,
Part V examines the role played by the new leadership of the state bar in
the eventual success of the bar integration movement in Wisconsin.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE BAR INTEGRATION MOVEMENT
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, most occupations
formed some type of a professional organization. These organizations in-
fluenced, in varying degrees, the development of American social and
economic policy. It was during this time that powerful professional
groups such as the American Medical Association ("AMA") emerged.
Organizations such as the these shaped the role of their professions in a
modem society and in the evolving administrative state.4
The organization of the legal profession occurred slowly. To be sure,
the process of licensing and regulation of the profession was "friendly" in
that lawyers themselves were usually consulted in the making of legisla-
tion related to their business. Organized groups of attorneys, however,
did not play a significant role in this process. The AMA, by contrast,
grew in numbers and influence; by 1929, nearly sixty-five percent of
America's physicians were members of the AMA. By contrast, only
eighteen percent of the nation's lawyers were members of the American
Bar Association in 1930. State bar associations also had low membership
rates during these years.5 These so-called "voluntary bars" were plagued
by limited finances and limited influence at this time. Even in large urban
areas, bar associations functioned mainly as social clubs and had little or
no impact on policies or politics.6
The lack of an organized lobby for attorneys compounded another
problem. In the first decades of the twentieth century, many members of
the legal community thought that the profession was in the midst of a
"crisis," which was caused by declining ethical standards and a surplus of
attorneys. The bar integration movement was an answer to this crisis.
The compulsory or integrated bar association movement sought to raise
4. There is a sizable amount of literature on the Progressive Era. See generally RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955); ROBERT H. WIEBE,
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967). For the interaction between economic change
and reform, see JOHN W. CHAMBERS III, THE TYRANNY OF CHANGE: AMERICA IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1900-1917 (1980).
5. The concept of "friendly reform" is discussed in Lawrence Friedman, Law Reform in
Historical Perspective, 13 ST. Louis U. L.J. 351 (1969). For an analysis of the impact of the
American Medical Association, see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982), 235-89. For the membership problems of voluntary bar associa-
tions, see, Schneyer, supra note 3, at 8-9.
6. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 8-9.
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the standards of the profession and speak as a unified voice for the inter-
ests of attorneys as a class.7 The American Judicature Society ("AJS")
made bar integration part of its law reform agenda in 1913. Based in Chi-
cago, the AJS drafted a model bar integration statute in 1918.8 The Jour-
nal of the American Judicature Society [hereinafter, the Journal] served as
a source for information and publicity on the subject.9
Herbert Harley, the executive secretary of the AJS, was one of the
leading spokesmen of the bar integration movement. Harley outlined the
basic principles of the reform movement in a speech that he gave to the
Lancaster County Bar Association of Lincoln, Nebraska on December 28,
1914. According to Harley, the impact of specialization, the growth of
large law firms, and the adversary system itself fragmented any degree of
professional consciousness among lawyers. Rather, these trends rein-
forced the traditional sense of individualism among lawyers. Strong state
bar organizations could counter these trends and assist lawyers in bol-
stering their status and promote professional standards and discipline.0
Harley praised the Law Society of Upper Canada and its role in the Ca-
nadian legal system. The unified bar in Canada administered lawyer dis-
cipline and controlled the bar admissions process.
In an American version of a unified bar, all practicing attorneys would
be required to be members, pay dues, abide by its rules, and adhere to a
code of ethics. Attorneys who violated the bar's rules and code would be
subject to expulsion. Proponents of bar integration claimed that it was
only fair and equitable that all lawyers bear the costs of an association
that promoted the interests and ideals of the profession as a whole.11 Such
a renowned legal scholar as Roscoe Pound described the bar integration
movement as "the last stage in reprofessionalizing the Bar."' 2
Professional regulation has traditionally been a state concern. Conse-
quently, voluntary state bars had to lobby their legislatures for action.
Three basic bar integration strategies emerged in the early twentieth cen-
tury.' The first plan, often referred to as the "California Plan,"
7. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 648-652 (1985). An
analysis of the "crisis" is presented in Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept
of Legal Professionalism, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 144-73 (Robert L.
Nelson, et al. eds., 1992).
8. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 9. See also McKEAN, supra note 1, at 30-37.
9. Herbert Harley, A Lawyer's Trust, 29 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 50 (1945); Smith
supra note 1, at 38-39.
10. See SORENSON, supra note 1, at 30-37.
11. See Annotation, Integrated State Bar, 114 A.L.R. 161,161-62 (1938).
12. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER IN ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 349 (1953).
13. Clarence F. Giles, An Analysis of the Integrated Bar, 17 ALB. L. REV. 231, 233-34
10031998]
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gave state legislatures the ultimate control over attorneys. This
was common in states where the power to control or regulate at-
torneys was not delegated by the constitution. Many of these
same legislatures eventually revised their statutes to give the ju-
diciary more of a role.
The second plan, the "Kentucky Plan," involved the passage of a stat-
ute that established a "broad outline of organization" to be refined by
subsequent court rules. This method was used in states where strong op-
position to close legislative control existed. This scheme put lawyers un-
der the more direct supervision of the courts. The third plan relied al-
most exclusively on the court's inherent powers to control the bar. It was
often implemented where the legislature failed to approve bar integration
or where political conflicts in the legislature overturned it. In Oklahoma,
for example, the state legislature integrated the state bar in 1929. The act,
however, was repealed ten years later. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
quickly exercised its power by combining rival bar organizations within
the state and creating a unified Oklahoma Bar Association.
4
A slightly different sequence of events occurred in Wisconsin. Al-
though the legislature passed a statute in 1943 to permit the Supreme
Court to integrate the bar, the Court declared that it did not need the
legislature's permission and could constitutionally integrate the bar under
its own authority.
III. THE WISCONSIN CAMPAIGN FOR BAR INTEGRATION, 1934-1956
In 1878, the Wisconsin Bar Association was founded as a voluntary
association. At its first convention, Chief Justice Ryan called on the
state's attorneys to work together on legislative issues and to eliminate
the unethical members of the legal profession in Wisconsin."5 There was
no actual recommendation, however, to match this rhetoric. The first re-
corded discussion of bar integration in Wisconsin occurred during the
1914 convention. President Claire B. Bird portrayed an integrated bar as
a fundamental and radical reform that was the "only remedy" for the pro-
fession's ills. Bird maintained:
Any action taken would be representative of the whole bar;
there would be no need of spasmodic effort, as now to keep up
(1953).
14. Maynard E. Pirsig, Integration of the Bar and Judicial Responsibility, 32 MINN. L. REV.
1, 16-19 (1947). Another account of their tangled process is presented in In re Integration and
the State Bar of Oklahoma, 95 P.2d 113 (Okla. 1939).
15. Ryan's statement is discussed in Edmund B. Shea, The President's Annual Address,
35 REP. ST. B. ASS'N Wis. 4,7 (1945). See also Schneyer, supra note 3, at 15 n.78.
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its work and sustain interest in it; there would be sufficient funds
and authority to investigate infractions and enforce standards of
conduct, which would include and permit discipline in cases of
minor shortcomings that do not merit the severe action of sus-
pension or disbarment; lawyers would come to realize that they
are more officers of the Court and less the agents of selfish indi-
viduals or interests; and the responsibility imposed would result
unconsciously in the recognition of higher standards and more
disinterested services.6
The first campaign to persuade the Wisconsin legislature to integrate
the bar began in 1933. Officers of the Wisconsin Bar Association had
long complained of their lack of significance in "the affairs of the State.'
17
Unlike the State Medical Society or the Teachers' Association, most bills
sponsored by the Wisconsin Bar had met defeat. Lloyd K. Garrison, who
had recently been appointed Dean of the University of Wisconsin Law
School, spoke directly to the issue in that year at the state bar convention.
Garrison described the weaknesses of the voluntary organization and
contrasted it with the positive experience of the integrated bar in other
states. He then suggested that the state bar present a plan for an inte-
grated bar to the Wisconsin legislature.'8 Garrison emphasized the value
of being able "to go to the legislature with well thought out programs"
that would improve the image of lawyers. 9
Several developments may have contributed to this decision. The
Wisconsin Bar Association was successful during the 1920s in shaping le-
gal policy. The legislature had given the Wisconsin Supreme Court the
authority to change court practice. The court created a committee-with
the active assistance of the Wisconsin Bar Association-to study the
situation and recommend changes. In 1927, the role of the Board of Bar
Commissioners was expanded to include investigation and prosecution of
grievances against individual attorneys.2° Earlier, in a 1925 ruling, the Su-
preme Court accepted the ABA Canons as guidelines for the conduct of
16. Claire B. Bird, This Association: What Can It Be and Do? 10 REP. ST. B. ASs'N WIS.
193,203-04(1914).
17. Report of Committee Appointed in 1917 to Consider and Report on the Address of
President Goggins, 13 REP. ST. B. ASS'N WIS. 332, 338-39 (1920). See also Schneyer, supra
note 3, at 8-9.
18. Lloyd K. Garrison, Experience of Other States With Incorporated Bars, PROCEEDINGS
ST. B. Wis. 41-42 (1933).
19. Report of the Committee on Qualifications to the Wisconsin State Bar Association of
Wisconsin, 23 REP. ST. B. ASS'N WIS. 79,84-85 (1933).
20. See Wisconsin Takes a Long Step Forward, 13 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 71 (1929);
Horace Wilkie, The Role of the Supreme Court in Regulating the Ethics of Lawyers and
Judges,49 Wis. B. BULL. 23,25 (Feb. 1976).
10051998]
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Wisconsin lawyers. 2' The impact of these reforms, as Theodore Schneyer
suggests, may have lessened the perceived need for bar integration.2 By
1935, Garrison admitted "[there was] no great disciplinary problem in
Wisconsin," but he continued to argue the merits of bar integration.2Y
The Wisconsin bar formally made bar integration a legislative issue
nearly 20 years after Bird's first statement. The severe problems of the
voluntary bar in retaining members during the Great Depression proba-
bly contributed to this decision.2 Fittingly, Bird was named as the chair
of the new Bar Integration Committee. During the winter of 1933-34, the
new Bar Integration Committee examined the integration statutes of
other states, analyzed newspaper articles on the subject from across the
state, and conducted "voluminous correspondence" with individuals who
had conducted successful bar integration campaigns. The deans of the
law schools at both the University of Wisconsin and Marquette Univer-
sity endorsed the plan. The Bird Committee proclaimed that "bar inte-
gration everywhere has received the overwhelming endorsement of law-
yers and the public."
Bird reiterated the message of 1914: bar integration was an overdue
reform that would change the legal profession and its image among the
general public. "In permitting our profession to degenerate into a private
commercial business," Bird stated in 1934, "we have well nigh forgotten
our public responsibility as court officers." The state should demand
more of lawyers than other occupations and compulsory membership in a
professional organization would be "good for the public." Wisconsin
proponents also stressed that attorneys were educated and empowered to
serve the general public. Lawyers, unlike businessmen, were able to see
beyond their "selfish interests" and work solely for the public good. Ear-
lier in the century, Bird noted that personal injury lawyers and defense
lawyers put together a comprehensive plan for workmen's' compensation
in Wisconsin, even at the cost of their own income. Since attorneys were
"officers of the court," they approached political issues-in Bird's mind at
least-with the level of civic-mindedness expected of statesmen and pub-
lic officials.'
21. See Heppe v. Petrie, 200 N.W. 857 (Wis. 1924).
22. Schneyer supra note 3, at 23-26.
23. Garrison, Remarks, 24 REP. ST. B. ASS'N OF WIS. 140 (June 1934).
24. See Schneyer, supra note 3, at 12 n.61.
25. The Integrated Bar Bill, 8 B. ST. B. ASS'N WIS. 5-6 (Supp. 1935).
26. Claire Bird, Reporting for the Committee on The Unified Bar, 24 REP. WIs. ST. B.
ASS'N. 116, 117-18 (1934). See also Bar Integration Acts in the Making, 18 J. AM. Ju-
DICATURE Soc'Y 25 (1934).
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It would take more than a declaration of public service, however, to
convince Wisconsin attorneys of the necessity of an integrated bar. Ear-
lier in the century, Harley and the AJS emphasized the tangible economic
benefits that bar integration would bring. Voluntary bars were unable to
protect the economic interests of lawyers. By contrast, an integrated bar
could fix prices through a minimum fee schedule and "[allow] tongue and
buckle to meet.2' The AJS amplified on this theme during the Great
Depression. The Journal often reported on the plight of lawyers in other
countries during the 1930s. For example, in 1935 the German bar advo-
cated a "complete closure" of admissions to the bar for three years" and a
more restrictive policy after that. The Journal reported with approval the
comments of the president of the German Bar Association that the
"proletarianization" of the bar must be forestalled by controls on the
supply of future lawyers.? The American bar integration movement cer-
tainly intensified during the Great Depression. In the 1930s, the bar was
unified in 15 states-more than any other decade since the movement be-
gu 29gan.
In Wisconsin, an income-oriented approach clearly had appeal. Some
public statements suggest that bar integration was presented as a panacea
for all economic ills. "The existence of an absolute oversupply of law-
yers," stated Garrison in 1935, "seems to have been seriously asserted [in
the state of Wisconsin] only within the last six years."30 The Depression
apparently cut into the incomes of lawyers, even though the volume of
business grew due to increased bankruptcies and debt collections." Ad-
vocates of bar integration maintained that its passage would aid in the
fight against the unauthorized practice of law by collection agencies.32 A
committee report from the State Bar noted that an influx of dues from
new members would create a "war chest" that could be used to finance
investigations of the unauthorized practice of law.33 In 1937 President
Graves told the State Bar that bar integration would "protect the bread
27. This statement is recounted in Herbert Harley, A Lawyer's Trust, 29 J. AM. JU-
DICATURE SOC'Y 50 (1945).
28. German Lawyers in Desperate Plight, 17 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 60 (1933).
29. JEFFREY A. PARNESS, CITATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE UNIFIED BAR IN THE
UNITED STATES 3-5 (1973 & Supp.).
30. Lloyd K. Garrison, A Survey of the Wisconsin Bar, 10 WIS. L. REV. 131,133 (1935).
31. Claims State Lawyers Make Good Incomes, CAP. TIMES, May 6,1935.
32. Integrated Bar Bill Argued, MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 7, 1937. The problem of non-
lawyers performing legal work is discussed in Warren Resh, The Unauthorized Practice of
Law-Activities of the State Bar Association, 1945 WiS. L. REV. 163 (1945).




and butter of its members." Graves stated that lawyers deserved
"practical results of direct and visible benefit to them." These goals in-
cluded eliminating the unauthorized practice of law or punishing those at-
torneys who charged below the proposed fee schedule. There were sim-
ply "too many lawyers... law schools, students," and "if the bar [would]
be integrated,... all such problems may be... solved."''
The first significant bar integration bill was introduced in 1935. At the
time, only about half of the state's approximately 3,000 lawyers were
members of the State Bar Association. The bill sought to create a bar as-
sociation comprised of "every lawyer who practiced in the state." All
members would elect a president and a vice-president. A board of gover-
nors would be elected for three-year terms from each of the state's judi-
cial circuits. The bill outlined specific powers of the board of governors.
The board was to set up rules for elections, determine annual dues, pro-
vide for an annual meeting of the general membership, and define
"unprofessional conduct." The board was also given broad powers to
"investigate complaints of unauthorized practice of law," as well as any
misconduct among its own members. A referee would conduct a hearing
and an internal committee would review the transcript, receive comments
from interested parties, and ultimately make a decision on the matter.
The affected party would then have thirty days to ask the Supreme Court
for review. The proposed statute would not eliminate the power of the
state bar commissioners or deprive citizens of the state from starting dis-
ciplinary proceedings on their own. The courts could still "censure, sus-
pend or disbar, or prescribe qualifications for practice in addition to the
minimum qualifications" already provided. 5
Wisconsin party politics, however, complicated this situation. The
Republican Party dominated the state legislature in the 1930s." The Re-
publicans were divided into the conservatives or "Stalwarts" and the
"Progressives." In state government, the Progressives championed the
interests of "the people" by creating a state income tax and establishing
several regulatory agencies. In 1934, the Progressive faction formed an
independent political organization. Progressives and radicals often char-
acterized lawyers as tools of "big business" and "foreign corporations."
The judiciary was also considered to be an obstacle to reform. The Pro-
34. Garrison, supra note 30, at 165-66; R.B. Graves, Address of the President, 27 REP. ST.
B. ASS'N WIS. 11, 20 (1937).
35. STATE OF WIS. LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, A BILL... TO
CREATE SECTION 256.31 PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION... OF THE WIS. STATE BAR
ASS'N 573 (March, 1935).
36. LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICS IN WISCONSIN 35-46 (1958).
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gressives advocated the popular recall of judges and the curbing of judi-
cial discretion by constitutional amendmentY While Wisconsin courts
were malleable to social and political reform, Progressives were skeptical
of any reform that might insulate the legal profession from public scru-
tiny. The bar integration bill would have to garner enough support from
the Progressive Party to succeed in the state legislature.
Supporters and opponents alike viewed the reform in the larger con-
text of conflicts over government regulation of the economy and individ-
ual activity. Some Wisconsin Progressives, for example, maintained that
a unified bar would function much as a "lawyers' trust." An integrated
bar would be dominated by the "big corporation attorneys that always
grab off the boss jobs in such organizations" and quash the "small-time
liberal lawyer" with threats of discipline."38 A Wisconsin state senator ar-
gued that any "organizations of lawyers provide a dangerous combina-
tion... in which one lawyer is in cahoots with another on the opposite
side."39
The attitudes of William T. Evjue typified the position of many of the
state's Progressives on the issue. Evjue was the editor of Madison's prin-
cipal newspaper, the Madison Capital Times [hereinafter, the Capital
Times].4 Evjue often stated that "corporation" lawyers controlled the
voluntary bar association in Wisconsin. These lawyers would use the dis-
ciplinary powers of the integrated bar to manipulate yet another Ameri-
can institution in favor of trusts and corporations. The Capital Times
painted "integration-oriented lawyers" as pawns of "the rich and power-
ful" in these years. Evjue noted that Bird was a "corporation lawyer" and
that his Wausau-based law firm "represented the interests of corporate
wealth." Evjue and other opponents also mentioned that the member-
ship problems within the State Bar meant that Wisconsin's lawyers had
already "voted" against bar membership with their pocketbook.4'
37. The most succinct explanation of the origins of the Wisconsin Progressive move-
ment is ROBERT MAXWELL, LAFOLLETrE AND THE RISE OF THE PROGRESSIVES IN
WISCONSIN (1956). The Wisconsin Progressive Party during the 1930s is discussed in JOHN
F. MILLER, GOVERNOR PHILIP LAFOLLETTE, THE WISCONSIN PROGRESSIVE PARTY, AND
THE NEW DEAL (1982).
38. Editorial, MADISON CAP. TIMES, June 30,1935, at 22.
39. Gabriel J. Tolan, Hunt Pours Fire on State Bar Measures, MADISON CAP. TIMES, May
7,1935, at 2.
40. See WILLIAM T. EVJUE, A FIGHTING EDITOR (1968). See Charles H. Backstrom, The
Progressive Party of Wisconsin, 1934-1946 (1956) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Wisconsin) (discussing Evjue and the Progressive Party.)
41. Editorial, MADISON CAP. TIMES, Dec. 5,1941; William T. Evjue, The Integrated Bar Is
Proposed Again, MADISON CAP. TIMES, Mar. 3,1937, at 2.
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Public hearings on the issue of bar integration revealed that opposi-
tion or support of the bill often transcended ideology. Joseph Padway, a
Milwaukee labor attorney, declared that he supported the bill because "it
has in it one of the most sacred principles of labor." Padway hoped that
lawyers and judges would learn that workers had the same right to a un-
ion shop when labor cases came up for consideration. At the same hear-
ing, however, a self-described "liberal lawyer" stated that the bill was a
"real menace" to the public. He remarked that, "in Alabama, where a
unified bar is in operation, the bar refused to furnish an attorney to de-
fend the Scottsboro negroes." 42 Others saw a more sinister plan afoot.
For example, a Madison attorney viewed this as but the first phase of a
secret campaign by the ABA to force Wisconsin's lawyers into the con-
servative national organization.'3
Wisconsin critics of bar integration also pointed to the dangers of
mixing politics and the bar. Huey P. Long's "unfriendly" unification of
the Louisiana bar was a case in point: Only pro-Long individuals were
selected to be members of the governing board and only lawyers em-
ployed by the State actively participated in the organization. ' Many Wis-
consin lawyers were also alarmed by events in nearby Illinois. In 1933,
the Illinois Supreme Court delegated extraordinary authority to two pri-
vate bar associations to investigate and prosecute grievances against
members and non-members for ethical violations.4 State-dictated bar
membership reminded many of the controversies surrounding govern-
ment planning and the New Deal. One Wisconsin politician stated that
he opposed the bar integration bill because government lawyers were
"already telling farmers where to plant their corn. ' 6 Others feared that,
If bar integration succeeded, people could no longer represent themselves
pro se in small claims courts but have to employ lawyers whose fees and
costs were immune from competition. As the President of the Vernon
County Bar Association noted:
Every argument and point made in the decisions of the supreme
court of the United States in the N.R.A. and the N.I.R.A. cases
against the constitutionality of "force" legislation.., applies
42. 50 Attorneys Argue Over 'Closed Shop'for Lawyers, MADISON CAP. TIMES, Apr. 4,
1935.
43. Integrated Bar Bill Fund Raising, Wall Street Measure, U.S. Court Official Claims,
MADISON CAP. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1937.
44. See Statutory Organization for Louisiana Bar, 18 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 110
(1934).
45. See Illinois Bar on Integration Route, 17 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 21 (June 1933).
See also Schneyer, supra note 3, at 23.
46. Hunt Pours Fire on State Bar Measure, MADISON CAP. TIMEs, May 7, 1935.
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here to bar integration. Of course, those who sponsored this law
were probably among those who still think the N.R.A. and
N.I.R.A cases were wrongly decided, and that a little thing like
the constitution is of no moment.47
Finally, many Progressives were opposed to the Wisconsin Bar's
support for the elimination of the popular election of judges. In 1934,
the Judicial Selection Committee of the State Bar endorsed the
"Missouri Plan." This scheme called for the replacement of regular
elections with periodic referenda on sitting judges. Judges would be
chosen by the governor from a list of jurists compiled by the State Bar's
Judicial Council. Not surprisingly, the plan met with a good deal of op-
position in Wisconsin. Evjue and the Capital Times campaigned
against both bar integration and court reform because these reforms
would lead to the erosion of popular democracy.
49
The bill thus went through significant changes while in committee.
An amendment was introduced by David Sigman, a Progressive assem-
blyman from Two Rivers, which declared that: "Political economic or re-
ligious views in any manner shall not be used as grounds for admission or
disbarment in the practice of the law." Sigman introduced this measure
to alleviate the concern of those who championed the interests of "little"
lawyers. Even with these amendments, however, the bill failed to garner
enough support within the Progressive Party.'°
The struggle in the legislature was conducted from May through
August in 1935. The Bar Integration bill passed the Assembly by a vote
of 51 to 38 and in the Senate by 17 to 14. The configuration of the vote
can be attributed to the fact that Progressives made up less than half of
the membership in the assembly. With one exception, the Assembly
voted against the bill. The bar integration measure was essentially passed
by a coalition of Stalwart Republicans and Democrats who combined to
constitute a slight majority. The final draft of the bill contained an
amendment on admissions and disbarments, along with another section
added by the Senate, which provided that the unified bar could not
"endorse, oppose, or contribute to any political party or candidate for
47. From the President of the Vernon County Bar Ass'n, MADISON CAP. TIMES May 11,
1943.
48. See Joseph A. Ranney, Practicing Law in the 20th Century: The Courts and the Bar
Grapple with Growth, Part 1, 70 WIS. LAWYER 14, 19 (March 1997).
49. See Green Lake Convention of Wisconsin Bar Association, MADISON CAP. TIMES,
June 29,1937.
50. STATE OF WiS. LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY, AMENDMENT TO A BILL... TO PROVIDE





When the bill passed, Governor Philip LaFollette was in Washington,
D.C.52 In LaFollette's absence, acting Governor O'Malley, a onetime
railroad conductor, vetoed the bill. O'Malley reiterated the sentiment of
many laypersons on bar integration. The veto message stated that bar in-
tegration "would destroy [the] local bar associations which had recently
developed and could better serve the needs of the individual lawyers than
could individuals at a central office far away." The trend, if encouraged,
would "destroy the last remaining particle of home rule in the profes-
sion." An attempt to override the acting governor's veto failed in the
Senate by a vote of 13 to 19."
A subsequent bill was introduced in the 1937 legislative session. This
bill was shorter and much less detailed than the version introduced only
two years earlier. Instead of an elaborate description of the integrated
bar's structure and powers, the bill simply provided that the Supreme
Court should organize the state bar as a "representative, self-governing
body," and should prescribe the group's disciplinary powers. This bill
eventually died in committee with the closing of the session.4 Two similar
bills-containing the language of the 1937 bill-met a similar fate in the
1939 and 1941 sessions.
55
Finally, in 1943, the political logjam broke. The Wisconsin bar was in-
tegrated when the Assembly and the Senate passed a bill by votes of 60 to
31 and 24 to 9, respectively. The bill was subsequently vetoed because
bar integration would "encroach unduly" on the freedom of the individ-
ual lawyer.56 The bill, however, was enacted over the governor's veto.
The integration statute was short and broadly worded. It established
membership in the "State Bar of Wisconsin" as a "condition precedent to
the right to practice law in Wisconsin." The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
51. STATE OF Wis. LEGISLATURE, SENATE, COMM. ON LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE, A
BILL... TO PROVIDE FOR THE ORGANIZATION... OF THE WIS. BAR ASS'N, Bill n.119S (Feb.
13,1935).
52. According to Philip Habermann, Governor LaFollette had originally supported bar
integration, but may have changed his mind when many Progressives publicly opposed it. See
HABERMANN, supra note 3, at 40.
53. O'Malley Vetoes Bar Bil Says It Hurts Home Rule, MILWAUKEE J., Aug. 1, 1935, at 1;
STATE OF WISCONSIN, LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS, 62d SEss. 73 (1935).
54. STATE OF WIS. LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY, COMM. ON PUBLIC WELFARE, A BILL...
TO PROVIDE FOR THE ORGANIZATION... OFTHE WIS. BAR ASS'N, Bill n.24A (Mar. 4,1937).
55. STATE OF WISCONSIN, LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS, 63rd SESS. 600 (1937).
56. Orville Loomis was elected governor in 1942. He died, however, before his inaugura-
tion. Under these circumstances, the lieutenant governor became the acting governor for the
rest of the term. See Hoenig, supra note 3, at 68.
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was given the authority to define the rights of its members and supervise
the integrated bar "in the efficient administration of justice."'
The story behind the eventual passage of this bill over the acting gov-
ernor's veto is a complicated one. The Capital Times described the entire
process as "smelly and raw." 8 This controversy and acrimony provided
the basis for the first legal challenge to bar integration that reached the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.
The bill returned to the Senate after its veto, where it was overridden
by a little more than the required two-thirds majority-22 to 8. In the
Assembly, anti-integration Assemblyman Michael O'Connell, a Milwau-
kee Democrat and attorney, raised a point of order that the "use of pairs"
was invalid on a vote to override a veto. The pair was a parliamentary
device created to give a legislator who was legitimately sick or absent the
chance to have his or her vote recorded." Republican Speaker Thomson
ruled that pairs was appropriate "under these conditions." When the As-
sembly eventually voted on the bill, 51 members voted for the integration
bill and 25 voted no. In this vote, 8 members were absent and 25 voted
no. Based on this count, the speaker declared that the Assembly had
passed the bill over the acting Governor's veto. This announcement
"caused an uproar in the Assembly." The 51-25 vote overturned the veto
only if the paired votes were not counted. Had the pairs been counted,
the governor's veto would have been sustained by a vote of 59-33, one
vote short of the required two-thirds majority.' °
O'Connell immediately wanted to know why pairs had not been
counted under the provisions of the decision earlier in the day. Thomson
replied that "pairs were a courtesy extended to absent members" so that
they might record their vote on a bill, "but that paired votes did not count
in the total vote." The Assembly's journal read that Thomson had an-
swered O'Connell's original question on pairs by stating that "it was
proper to pair on all questions" of this kind. Progressive assemblyman
Lyall Beggs of Madison later maintained that this and other possible al-
terations of the record were "added after the journal went to the
printer."" The disputed vote was only one of several peculiarities during
57. 1943 WIS. LAWS 315,497.
58. Editorial, Smelly and Raw, MADISON CAP. TIMES, May 6,1943.
59. ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE AND
THE COURSE OF BUSINESS IN THE FRAMING OF STATUTES 379-80 (1922).
60. STATE OF WISCONSIN, LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS, 66th SESS. 42-44 (1943). For an
analysis of this voting procedure, see Integration of the Bar Case, 11 N.W.2d 604 607-17(Wis.
1943).
61. See Hoenig, supra note 3, at 70-72 (interviewing Michael O'Connell and Lyall T.
1998] 1013
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the Assembly's reexamination of the integrated bar. Ernest Heden, a
longtime opponent of bar integration in the Assembly, told the press that
"he wanted to vote to sustain the veto but forgot to act because he was
watching the role call." Other assemblymen either unexpectedly changed
their vote or lost the opportunity through various procedural maneuvers.
Whatever the motivation, each individual legislator's action had a cumu-
lative impact: they made possible the 51-vote majority needed by the
pro-integration forces to sustain the veto.62
A bar integration statute was thus enacted after nearly an eight-year
struggle in the legislature. Charges of constitutional violations and the
nature of the vote nonetheless tainted the victory. Public statements
that the veto was overridden purely on the merits of the issue were in-
consistent with the record. At a Republican caucus before the vote on
the veto, it appeared that the party's leadership lacked support to repass
the bill. According to an interview given by one Republican assembly-
man, the leadership tried to build unity by telling the caucus "that the
Governor was vetoing too many bills" and asked party members to
override the veto "to prevent the Assembly from losing face." One
story circulated that a Republican opponent of the bill was asked by a
colleague to help override the veto because the Governor's action dur-
ing the session had created a "rise in public esteem" for him while that
of the legislature had declined.' Immediately after the roll call vote on
May 5, 1941, the Wisconsin State Journal queried Republican Mark
Catlin, Jr. about the voting peculiarities. Catlin declared that "the bill
had been vetoed by two acting governors and he thought that it de-
served a fair trial." When a journalist countered that it was the proce-
dure by which the bill was passed that created the controversy, Catlin
simply remarked: "I think the end justifies the means.""
IV. POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: THE SUPREME COURT AND BAR
INTEGRATION, 1943-1946
The judiciary now became the battleground in the campaign for bar
integration. The loss in the legislature simply changed tactics for the anti-
integration camp. Opponents of bar integration challenged both the va-
lidity of the vote to override the governor's veto and the legislature's
Beggs).
62. 1 Vote Margin is Scored By Rule Flouting, MADISON CAP. TIMES, May 5, 1943, at 3.
See also Solons Quizzed For Ducking on Bar Bill Vote, MADISON CAP. TIMES, May 6, 1943, at
1.
63. Integrated Bar Becomes Law, MILWAUKEE J., May 6,1943, at 2.
64. Bar Bill and House Kill Goodland's Veto, WIS. ST. J., May 5,1943, at 3.
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authority to order the Supreme Court to act in this fashion.
Only a few days after the Assembly overrode the veto, Acting Gover-
nor Goodland brought suit against Secretary of State Fred Zimmermann
to enjoin him from publishing the statute. Wisconsin's Constitution pro-
vided that a law could not be enforced until it was published in the state's
official record. Goodland cited the procedural irregularities and main-
tained that the bill would not have been passed except for the disputed
actions. In addition, Goodland's suit also declared that the bill amounted
to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Supreme
Court. A circuit judge from Dane County granted the injunction.65
When the case first reached the Supreme Court, the injunction was
vacated because there could be no judicial interference with a procedure
involving an "authentic legislative act." The Court further declared that
it could not deal with the constitutionality of a law until the law was en-
acted and that someone had been deprived of his rights because of it. The
court agreed with the governor, however, that after official publication it
could determine the validity of the bill on its own.'
The Supreme Court eventually ruled on the legality of the integration
statute in 1943. With respect to the legality of the Assembly's vote to
override the veto, the court declared that it could look no further than the
Assembly journal. If the journal's "plain language" showed that the Con-
stitution's rule for passing legislation had been observed, the court's ex-
amination ceased. The Assembly had a long-standing rule not to count
paired voter as present. Accordingly, the bill was enacted.67
The court next addressed the question of whether the statute was con-
stitutional because one branch ordered another branch of government to
act. The court declared that, while the legislature could not compel ac-
tion, it could act upon issues involving the "general welfare," which in-
cluded the supervision and licensing of trades and professions. The court
even suggested that it would adopt the legislature's suggestion so long as
the plan did not "embarrass the court or impair justice." The court, none-
theless declined to rule on the subject until the end of World War II
"because a large number of the lawyers [were] in the military."'
Before the Supreme Court had a chance to decide this issue, an at-
65. Goodland v. Zimmerman, 1 N.W.2d 180 (1943); See Injunction Granted in Bar Issue,
MILWAUKEE. J., May 30,1943, at 2.
66. See Edmund Shea, Wisconsin's Successful Bar Integration Campaign, 27 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOc'Y 13 (1943).
67. Integration of the Bar Case, 11 N.W.2d 604,616-17 (Wis. 1943).
68. Id. at 624-25. This seems to have been a widespread sentiment. See Hold Up Unified
Bar Bill Until Lawyers in Service Return, Is Plea, MADISON CAP. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1943.
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tempt was made in the legislature to repeal the integration statute. In
1945, a bill introduced by O'Connell was defeated in the Assembly when
a "motion to advance the matter by engrossment" failed by a 47 to 47
vote. The Assembly showed a majority in favor of the measure when it
voted against a motion by Thomson, now the Republican floor leader, "to
kill the bill." Some Progressives later commented that they eventually
opposed the measure because the bill was now meaningless in light of the
Supreme Court's declaration that they might integrate the bar in the ab-
sence of legislative authorization.69
More alarming to the State Bar was the controversy surrounding the
spring 1945 election. Justice Barlow of the Supreme Court ran for re-
election against the Secretary of State, Fred R. Zimmerman. A former
governor, Zimmerman had wide name recognition and had been elected
by wide margins to previous offices in Wisconsin. The most striking as-
pect of his candidacy was that he was not an attorney. This was not re-
quired under the constitution and the laws of Wisconsin. Indeed, Zim-
merman ran against the judiciary and blasted the "corporation lawyer
crowd" that sponsored judicial reform and bar integration. Zimmerman
condemned both proposals as "un-American, undemocratic importations
from Europe .... The insurgent candidate proclaimed that his decisions
as a Supreme Court justice would be based upon "common sense," not
the common law.7" This time, both the bar and most of the state press-
Progressive and otherwise-united in opposition to Zimmerman. Barlow
was subsequently re-elected after capturing 60% of the popular vote.71
The Zimmerman candidacy, however, seemed to scare both the legis-
lature and the judiciary away from the issue. The next attempt to induce
the Supreme Court to integrate the bar occurred in 1946. Quincy H.
Hale, then President of the Wisconsin Bar Association, filed a petition on
the matter with the court. The court rather surprisingly reversed itself on
the matter.72
The court's analysis in 1946 focused on the tension between state
69. Unified Bar Bill Repealer Voted Down, MADISON CAP. TIMES, May 8, 1945, at 2;
Pending Legislation, 18 B. ST. BAR AsS'N OF WIS. 92, 95 (1945); Defunct Progressives,
MADISON CAP. TIMES, May 6,1945.
70. For a personal-and biased-account of Zimmerman and his career, see PHILIP LA
FOLLETTE, ADVENTURES IN POLITICS: THE MEMOIRS OF PHILIP LAFOLLETTE 124-
27(Donald Young, ed.: 1970). See also Bid for Bench Tops Interest in Spring Vote,
MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 1, 1945.
71. See Barlow Beats Zimmennan by Big Margin, MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 14, 1945; The
MADISON CAP. TIMES was the only newspaper in the state to endorse Zimmerman's candidacy.
See Echoes From the Press, 18 B. ST. BAR ASS'N WiS. 53 (1945).
72. In re Integration of the Bar, 25 N.W.2d 500 (Wis. 1946).
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regulation and professional autonomy. In a per curiam opinion, the court
noted that both sides of the issue had the same set of assumptions as to
the role of the judiciary. This consensus included the following assump-
tion:
that the court will fully exhaust its function by setting up the or-
ganization and requiring dues to be paid and that from there on
the court will leave the organized bar to operate in a completely
democratic and voluntary manner, dealing with such prob-
lems... and exgending its moneys for these democratically
elected purposes.
Although it had the authority to do so, the court considered state-
ordered bar membership to be "unwise." The court reasoned that it
would compel attorneys to be agents of the judiciary and "impose upon
the Court [the] embarrassing duties of censorship and audit which might
lead to unfortunate misunderstandings." The original goals of bar inte-
gration-particularly improving the morale and expertise of lawyers-
could still be attained by a voluntary organization.'
The 1946 Integration Opinion was condemned by proponents of bar
integration as an "eccentric" holding. The editors of the Journal were
quick to point out that, except in matters of bar admission and attorney
discipline, courts and legislatures left the integrated state bars to them-
selves. By 1946, however, the politics of bar integration in Wisconsin
probably had more influence on judicial opinion than anything else.75 The
bar thus turned to other devices in an effort to rekindle support for the
reform effort.
Advocates of bar integration turned to another tactic as a means to
achieve their goal. Demands for a referendum among attorneys on the
issue of bar integration were expressed as early as 1937. The Wisconsin
State Bar Association was informed in 1941 that its integration bill failed
in the legislature because it "desired to give us what we want but could
not be convinced that we all wanted it." 
76
The desire for a referendum was also expressed by the Capital Times,
legislators, and individual attorneys. Evjue criticized the State Bar on a
number of occasions because there was no attempt to obtain a response
from the average state lawyer on the subject. Some lawyers in the state
73. Id. at 502.
74. Id. at 503. See also Justices Fear Censor Duties Under New Plan, WIS. ST. J., Dec. 18,
1946.
75. See AUTHOR, The Wisconsin Integration Opinion, 30 AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 147
(1947); Carl B. Dix, Integrated Bar Decision Flayed, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 9,1947.
76. James M. Murray, Remarks, 31 REP. ST. B. ASS'N WIS. 1, 11 (1941).
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felt the same way. In 1937, a Madison attorney testified before an As-
sembly hearing that "he was a member of a state bar association which
sponsored the proposed statute yet no one asked his opinion about it." In
1946 an amicus curiae brief complained in 1946 that no "bona fide at-
tempt [was] ... made to get the views of all lawyers in Wisconsin who care
to express an opinion."' The referendum issue also appeared during the
legislative conflict over the issue. Various unsuccessful attempts were
made in both houses of the legislature to amend the integration bill to in-
clude a court-administered referendum."
The leadership of the bar was certainly sensitive about the topic. In
an effort to build a consensus on the issue among state attorneys and per-
haps the judiciary, the state bar attempted to conduct a referendum on
the subject in 1942. Tellingly, the bar never requested the Wisconsin su-
preme court to conduct a referendum. This method had been used in
other States. In 1945, the Missouri Supreme Court conducted its own poll
of the bar prior to ordering integration in the state."
The Integration Committee divided Wisconsin into 22 districts (based
upon the state's judicial districts) with one member assigned to each area.
Each individual was responsible for canvassing his area "through such as-
sistants and by such methods as he might select." The recommended
technique included an interview "with every lawyer-member-and non-
member-in the state." The goal of the interview was to try to obtain a
"written endorsement of integration." If favorable, the respondent's en-
dorsement was to be included on what amounted to a petition. Some
supporters of an integrated bar were opposed to the referendum because
critics of the proposal were denied a voice. The petition basically stated
that the signers approved of the concept of bar integration as expressed in
the bill passed by the legislature in 1941. The survey was to record only
"yes" votes. Evjue and the Capital Times were quick to point out that the
ballot did not permit a "no" answer.8
The eventual "referendum" was not a plebiscite; it was a mechanism
to sell Wisconsin's lawyers on bar integration. William Doll, a former
president of the bar association, declared that the "purpose of the canvass
is to sell lawyers on the idea that the majority of the bar is for it." An-
77. Lawyers' Own Report Shows Lawyers Are Not For Bar, MADISON CAP. TIMES, Apr.
27,1943, at 5; Madison Attorneys Hit "Regimenting" in Bar Bill, MADISON CAP. TIMES, Apr. 9,
1937, at 2.
78. STATE OF WISCONSIN, LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL, 65 SESS. 463 (1939).
79. See Pirsig, supra note 14, at 21-23.
80. PROCEEDINGS, ST. B. OF WiS. 204-06 (1942); Editorial, MADISON CAP. TIMES, July
18, 1942, at 2.
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other supporter stated on the floor of the 1942 convention that "the can-
vassing committee should not count noses but should try to convince law-
yers... [that] the bar would benefit from integration."81
The full results of the poll were never published. The partial results
were published at the 1942 convention and included incomplete or final
returns from 39 counties. The remaining 32 counties failed to return any
information in response to the poll. Of the estimated 3,000 lawyers in
Wisconsin at that time, 867 declared their support for an integrated bar.
These figures included "only 204 of Milwaukee County's estimated 1,500
lawyers and no returns from Dane County" whose lawyer population was
thought to be at least 10% of the attorneys in the state.'
The next attempt at a referendum occurred in the spring of 1946. The
leadership of the State Bar declared that, if successful, the poll would be a
prelude to filing a formal petition for integration with the Supreme Court.
The form of the referendum once again favored bar integration. In con-
trast to the 1943 referendum, there was no vote recorded by county; a re-
port of this referendum was scarcely mentioned in president's address at
the 1946 convention. President Hale almost reported the referendum as a
"work in progress" to the convention:
This canvass has been completed and I believe that 95% of the
lawyers in the State have been personally contacted.... This
canvass is now complete through the State, except for Milwau-
kee County. I believe that it is running about 70% for Integra-
tion, although the count from Milwaukee County may materially
change that as about 40% of the lawyers in the state are in the
state are in Milwaukee and there is considerable opposition to
integration there.'
The referendum was never published. When asked about the final re-
sults in 1948, the new Executive Secretary Philip Haberman stated that
he was "certain the results favored integration." The data and other
material collected for the referendum "was destroyed sometime around
1953," according to Haberman, "because it was no longer needed.""
The concept of a referendum was dropped-for all intents and pur-
poses-in the 1950s. No poll was held in 1956 although opponents once
again requested one. President LaFrance, the head of the State Bar at
this time, maintained that such another referendum "would be too ex-
pensive." When pressed about the issue after bar integration had been
81. PROCEEDINGS, ST. B. OFWis. 206,214-15 (1942).
82. Id. at 25.
83. PROCEEDINGS, ST B. Wis. 58-59 (1946).
84. Interview with Philip S. Habermann, May 4,1961, in Hoenig, supra note 3, at 178.
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achieved, LaFrance replied that the Supreme Court was just not inter-
ested in the opinion of Wisconsin lawyers on the issue. Ironically, at
least some opponents of bar integration may have secretly felt the same
way. One reporter from the Capital Times later stated that his newspa-
per would not have softened its attitude on the subject of bar integra-
tion had the Supreme Court or "some impartial body" conducted a poll
on its own." By the mid-1950s, the leadership of the state bar had fo--
cused their energy on persuading the opinion of those who now mat-
tered most-the justices on the Supreme Court.
V. A NEW STATE BAR LEADERSHIP AND A SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN,
1955-1956
Bar integration was a "dead issue" for nearly a decade after the 1946
ruling. The Wisconsin Bar Association was reorganized in 1948. The re-
vamped organization hired a full-time executive director whose goal was
to enhance the association's image among attorneys and the public at
large.86 One man, Alfred E. LaFrance of Racine, is usually credited with
reviving the bar integration movement in Wisconsin. LaFrance had
served in a number of official roles for the state bar and was characterized
as a man with "a great deal of drive and a strong personality." One of
LaFrance's first acts as President of the Wisconsin Bar Association was to
put together a new bar integration committeeY. Thereafter, LaFrance,
Edmund Shea, and a small circle of perhaps ten other attorneys revived a
campaign that had begun decades earlier.'
In the "President's Page" of the Wisconsin Bar Bulletin, LaFrance
outlined a "four-point" program for his first year of office. LaFrance
wanted to integrate the bar, build a headquarters building in Madison, re-
organize the state courts, and restructure the judicial selection system
during his term. Regarding bar integration, the new President stated that:
Times may have changed, circumstances may have become al-
tered in Wisconsin since this problem was last given considera-
tion by our Supreme Court. Considering the progress that has
been made in this integration movement throughout the United
States, giving consideration to some of the problems that the
85. Interview with Miles McMillan, May 10, 1961, in Hoenig, supra note 3, at 168. McMil-
lan was a colleague of Evjue and became editor of the Capital Times in 1955.
86. See Philip S. Habermann, Proposed Expansion of Bar Association Activities, 21 WIS.
B. BULL. 228 (1948); Schneyer, supra note 3, at 12 n.58.
87. Another Move for Integrated Bar in Wisconsin Forecast, GREEN BAY PRESS
GAZETTE, Nov. 28, 1955.
88. Interview with Haberman, in Hoenig, supra note 3, at 168.
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members of the Wisconsin bar are today faced with and realizing
the limitations of a voluntary association, it seems to me that it is
timely that this matter again have the earnest consideration of all
of the lawyers in Wisconsin .... Many, many lawyers through-
out Wisconsin have suggested that something should be done on
this subject.'
LaFrance also suggested to Wisconsin attorneys that "integration un-
questionably will result in increased recompense to the practising lawyers
individually, through expanded public relations ... and through the
promulgation of information advising of the value of legal services in
given situations." 9 Even before LaFrance assumed the presidency, the
State Bar expanded efforts to improve its image among Wisconsin attor-
neys. The Wisconsin Bar Bulletin, which was established only in 1927,
was improved and expanded in the years after World War II. The maga-
zine was changed from a quarterly to a bi-monthly magazine. More im-
portantly, the tone and content of the magazine underwent a transforma-
tion. The new Bar Bulletin was designed to present articles and assistance
to the average lawyer engaged in a general practice.9' In addition sections
were created to educate state lawyers on various aspects of the law.
Membership benefits were expanded to include new insurance programs
and a placement service, and dues were increased from $2 to $12 a year in
order to finance these efforts. Membership in the voluntary bar soon in-
creased to nearly 66% of the total number of attorneys in the state.' The
tone of the message of bar integration, however, had changed from vague
notions of "law reform" to one of professional interest. LaFrance quoted
the address of a Florida judge in support of bar integration. The state-
ment read:
We do not think bar integration would be worth the candle as a
specific for unethical conduct, but as a means of giving the bar a
new and enlarged concept of its place in our social and economic
pattern it has amply proved its value.9
The idea of bypassing the legislature to appeal to the Supreme Court for
the integration of the State Bar was discussed by proponents of bar inte-
gration in Wisconsin as early as 1937. At the bar association convention
89. Alfred E. LaFrance, The President's Page, WIS. B. BULL. 5-6 (Aug. 1955).
90. Alfred E. LaFrance, The President's Page, Wis. B. BULL. 5,7 (Oct. 1955)
91. See Philip S. Habermann, Public Relations Begin with You, WIS. B. BULL. 11-16
(Feb. 1956). See also Interview with Habermann in Hoenig, supra note 3, at 114.
92. Oscar T. Toebaas, The President's Report, WiS. B. BULL. 11-12 (Aug. 1953); Schneyer,
supra note 3, at 12 n.58; Interview with Haberman in Hoenig, supra note 3, at 178.
93. Alfred E. LaFrance, The President's Page, WIS. B. BULL. 66 (Oct. 1955).
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in that year, President Ray B. Graves declared that the cause should be
taken directly to the bench if the politicians were reluctant to deal with
it.94 In 1941, Edmund Shea proposed this tactic after the Supreme Court
had failed to rule on the matter.95 This strategy eventually eclipsed a
commitment to the legislative process. James Willard Hurst suggested
that the earlier leadership of the Wisconsin bar may have felt "that a
court with little control over lawyers would be unlikely to integrate the
bar without legislative consent."96
Bar integration by judicial order was also a relatively new technique
in this era before the 1940s. In 1937, Nebraska became the first state to
integrate its bar by court order. After 1945, only one state-Alaska-was
integrated through legislative measures.' It is probable that the leaders
of the bar integration movement felt that requesting judicial intervention
from the highest court in the state would be fruitless due to public contro-
versy.
Petitioning the highest court in the state, however, soon became the
"preferred method" for bar associations seeking a unified bar. The strat-
egy avoided "politics" altogether and involved appeals to members of the
bench-the kind of individuals who would be receptive to the goals of bar
integration. More significantly, the Supreme Court had suggested in 1943
that it was able to consider the matter on its own. The leadership of the
State Bar in Wisconsin would fully exploit this suggestion in 1956.
In 1956, the Supreme Court ordered integration of the bar on an in-
terim basis. After a two-year trial period, the Court permanently inte-
grated the bar. Several factors probably explain this reversal. Between
1946 and 1955, every member of the Supreme Court was replaced, with
the exception of Justice Fairchild. The retirement of Chester A. Fowler,
who served from 1929 to 1948, removed the most determined opponent of
bar integration from the court. Those justices appointed after 1946 were
more receptive to bar integration and willing to look more favorably on
the issue." In 1946, the Court had declared that the objectives sought by
integration could be achieved through an adequately supported voluntary
association. The Court simply encouraged the state's lawyers to give their
94. PROCEEDINGS, ST. B. ASS'N OF WIS. 13 (1937).
95. PROCEEDINGS, ST. B. ASs'N WIS. 9 (1941).
96. Interview with James Willard Hurst, May 3, 1961, in Hoenig, supra note 3, at 133.
97. See Schneyer, supra note 3, at 43 n.246. See also PARNESS, supra note 29, at 3-5 n.4.
The story of the integration of the bar in Alaska is chronicled in Pamela Cravez, A Revolt In the
Ranks: The Great Alaska Court-Bar Fight, 13 ALASKA L. REv. 1 (1996).
98. Interview with Robert M. Rieser, May 22,1961, in Hoenig, supra note 3, at 132. Rieser
helped to argue the case on behalf of the state bar in 1956.
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"complete support" to the State Bar.9 In 1956, the court revised its posi-
tion once again:
Many individual members of the bar did respond to that sugges-
tion that they actively support the voluntary association, but it is
now reported that too many lawyers have refrained or refused to
join (emphasis added), that membership in the voluntary asso-
ciation has become static, and that a substantial minority of the
lawyers in the State are not associated with the State Bar Asso-
ciation."0
The lack of support for the voluntary bar in Wisconsin was character-
ized as a "big-city problem." Madison and Milwaukee lawyers had differ-
ent reasons to oppose or simply not join the state bar association. Class
and ethnicity may have played a part. In 1943, the Capital Times claimed
that the more established Wisconsin lawyers advocated an integrated bar
in the hopes of curbing the impact of "ambulance chasing" Jewish lawyers
in the Milwaukee area.'O In a 1961 interview on the subject, Professor
Hurst noted that lawyers in urban areas were hostile towards integration
because their local organizations usually thrived."° Lawrence Hart, a
member of the subcommittee, that drafted the 1955 petition, as well as
former president of the Dane County Bar Association, confirmed this.
Hart stated on several occasions that lawyers in these counties "had an
active local bar association of their own and did not believe that there was
a real need for a strong, quasi-official state organization." The president
of the Milwaukee County Bar Association, according to Hart, "had as
much work to do" as the chief executive of the state organization. The
Milwaukee County Bar "lobbied extensively" in the state legislature.
They were often successful in obtaining the passage of many special laws
that applied only to lawyers who resided in Milwaukee County." For ex-
ample, the legislature permitted the Milwaukee group to institute mal-
practice suits against "errant Milwaukee lawyers." This authority rested
in all other counties with the district attorney.'u As early as 1934, the
Milwaukee Lawyers Club had opposed bar integration on the grounds
that the city's attorneys would cede their autonomy to Madison."0
99. See In re Integration of the Bar, 25 N.W.2d 500,503 (Wis. 1946).
100. In the matter of the Integration of the Bar, 77 NW.2d 602,603 (Wis. 1956).
101. Editorial, MADISON CAP. TIMES, March 16, 1943, at 16; Editorial, MADISON CAP.
TIMES, May 11, 1943, at 20. Garrison testified before the legislature that the "controlling influ-
ence" in an integrated bar would come from the "... smaller towns and rural areas of the state."
MADISON CAP. TIMES, May 2,1935.
102. Interview with Hurst, in Hoenig, supra note 3, at 119-20.
103. Interview with Lawrence E. Hart, May 24,1961, in Hoenig, supra note 3, at 119.
104. The Integrated Bar Bill Enters the Last Phase, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Dec. 9,
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The publicity surrounding the bar integration issue seemed to affect
bar membership. From 1935 to 1956 the state association's membership
always remained at about 45%. However, during the intense debate be-
tween 1943 and 1946, the membership figures reached nearly 50%. By
1950, membership in the state bar association reached 68%, where it re-
mained until integration was endorsed by the Supreme Court.0 5 Despite
the higher membership figures, both the pro and anti-integration forces-
as well as the Supreme Court-made an issue of membership during the
next debate on the issue. The State Bar leadership appealed for integra-
tion in order to eliminate the recurring problems of recruitment and re-
tention of membership. Those opposed, to integration however, saw no
problem at all: the enrollment of nearly two thirds of lawyers in a volun-
tary bar seemed to solve the bar's earlier membership woes. The Su-
preme Court however, cited the estimated low membership figures over
the decades as one of the primary reasons for integrating the bar.
Of equal significance, LaFrance and Shea discussed bar integration on
an informal basis with several judges on the bench. The first of two re-
corded contacts between members of the bar association and Supreme
Court justices occurred in October, 1955. At that time, a Supreme Court
justice informed Haberman, the bar association's Executive Secretary,
that he favored bar integration. The conversation was recorded in a letter
from Haberman to La France:
Justice X, a member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court stopped at
my table at lunch Friday and said: "I'm glad to see you are
working on integration. I'm all for it." He further stated that he
had not discussed it with any other member of the Court, and
had no idea how they stand."
This informal contact was just the first step in a rather extended series
of discussions between the bar leadership and members of the Supreme
Court. This contact consisted of a meeting between a committee of the
state bar headed by La France and members of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. The purpose of another meeting, as mentioned in a letter by La-
France to Chief Justice Fairchild, was to "discuss procedural problems
concerned with the filing of an integration petition. "This can be an in-
formal conference, where we will not discuss the merits of the problem,
1934.
105. See In re Integration of the Bar, Original Proceedings for the Integration of the Bar,
Supplemental Report of the Drafting Committee, Analysis of the Membership, Schedule C, Ex-
hibit D (January 1956), reprinted in Hoenig, supra note 3, at 116.
106. Letter from Haberman to LaFrance, stamped "Received 25 Oct. 55 LaFrance ... and
Zahn, Attorneys at Law," in Hoenig, supra note 3, at 188.
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but will seek the counsel and advise (sic) of your court as to how you pre-
fer to have the matter subsequently presented to the Court."' 1
This meeting was criticized by some "as an example of a policy mak-
ing body legitimizing a predetermined policy instead of authorizing
one. ''""a Although this informal discussion might be considered ex parte
in some situations, both the leaders of the State Bar and the Supreme
Court seemed to consider it ethical. A report of the meeting by LaFrance
in his column in the Wisconsin Bar Bulletin exclaimed: "Your President,
with members of the Executive Committee and others, were privileged to
have an audience with the members of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
where procedural problems were discussed and considered."' O'
The Supreme Court held public hearings on the subject throughout
much of 1955. Many of the same arguments heard before World War H
were made at this time."' However, the intensity and extent of the oppo-
sition seemed to have lessened in the decade after the first ruling. The
Progressive Party had disappeared as an organized force; the more
"liberal" elements moved to the Democratic Party, while others remained
aligned with the Republicans. Evjue, for example, remained an opponent
of bar integration, but he was caught up in the politics of McCarthyism.
Regardless of party affiliation, bar integration ceased to be a convenient
political target in the era of the Cold War and mass prosperity."'
The more entrenched opponents of bar integration had also departed
from the ranks of the state's attorneys. One example illustrates this
change. The leadership in the twelve-member Vernon County Bar Asso-
ciation, which-along with the bars of Madison and Milwaukee opposed
bar integration in the 1940s-was in the hands of J. Henry Bennett. Ben-
nett was a vigorous opponent of bar integration. Contemporaries charac-
terized Bennett as an "old-time backwoods lawyer" who thought an at-
torney should "act as an individual" and "not be regimented" in any way.
He had by all accounts "an extremely strong personality," and thus he
dominated the County Bar Association. Not surprisingly, he was able to
convince the other lawyers in the county of the correctness of his views on
bar integration. Bennett died on April 29,1956, about twenty days before
his scheduled appearance at a hearing before the Supreme Court on the
107. Letter from LaFrance to Fairchild, Nov. 30,1955, Hoenig, supra note 3, at 191.
108. See comments by Hoenig, supra note 3, at 193-94.
109. Alfred LaFrance, The President's Page, WiS. B. BULL. 5 (Feb. 1956).
110. See, e.g., Labor Attorney for Integrated Bar; Aberg Opposes It, Madison Cap.
Times, Apr. 14, 1956; Spohn Leads Fight in Supreme Court Against Integration, MADISON
CAP. TIMES, May 9, 1956.
111. See MILLER, supra note 37, at 181-82.
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subject. Someone far less interested in the issue and more malleable to
persuasion replaced him."'
After the successful effort, LaFrance became an active spokesman for
bar integration in other states. He noted that one of the advantages of an
integrated bar was that, as a state agency, the Wisconsin Bar "is entitled
to the advice and representation of the attorney-general.... For example,
the [Wisconsin] attorney general rendered an opinion to the State Bar to
the effect that its property is exempt from taxation and then sustained
that opinion in the courts, all without expense to the bar" (emphasis
added).' In over 40 years, Claire Bird's message about bar integration
and law reform had been significantly altered in scope and purpose.
VII. CONCLUSION
The 1956 decision seemingly settled the debate over the integrated
bar in Wisconsin. By the mid-1950s, determined opposition had largely
disappeared and-just as significantly-the promotional strategy had
changed. The tactics of legislative lobbying and referendum gave way to
direct lobbying with the Supreme Court. LaFrance's campaign, in con-
trast to previous efforts, linked the reform to a strategy more suitable to
bench and bar. The content of the reform, however, had shifted from the
uplifting of professional standards and public service to an emphasis on
self-interest.
Even after 1956, political and legal controversy has characterized the
integrated bar in Wisconsin. The constitutionality of the integrated bar
was affirmed in 1961 by the United States Supreme Court in Lathrop v.
Donohue."' Nevertheless, the integrated bar has been intermittently
challenged and discussed over the last three decades."5 The contours of
the debate have not changed much. Opponents continue to argue that
the integrated bar is an infringement on the individual right of association
and incidental to professional standards and the image of the bar; sup-
porters still maintain that such association is a good in itself. The most
recent Supreme Court decision is typical in this regard."6 The majority
opinion upheld bar integration as a legitimate concern for state regula-
112. Interview with Philip S. Habermann, May 14,1961 in Hoenig, supra note 3, at 117.
113. LaFrance's statement is quoted in Philip Haberman, Advantages of the Unified Bar,
10 N.H. BJ. 36,38 (1967).
114. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
115. There is a sizable amount Wisconsin case law of the subject since 1956. For a useful
synthesis, see Peter A. Martin, Comment, A Reassessment of Mandatory Bar Membership In
Light of Levine v. Heffernan, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 144 (1989).
116. See Matter of State Bar, 485 N.W.2d 225 (Wis. 1992).
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tion. Without it, programs such as the Lawyer Referral Service or various
pro bono activities would be scrapped due to inadequate funding. In ef-
fect, the integrated bar-echoing in part the message of Claire Bird-
properly mandates that lawyers "support the professional functions and
activities directed to the interests of the public." ' Although the bar in
Wisconsin has remained unified for all but four years since 1956, the sub-
ject remains an almost continual source of contention in state and federal
court
118
Since 1914, the integrated bar has been as much about conflicts within
and about the legal profession as anything else. The period between 1934
and 1956 demonstrates how both politics and timing can play role in the
decisionmaking process of the legislature and the courts. While the le-
gality of the integrated bar in Wisconsin is a settled issue, it is doubtful
that its effectiveness or desirability will ever be a moot point for attorneys
in the state.
117. Id. at 228-29.
118. The latest federal cases are Crosetto v. State Bar of Wisconsin, 12 F.3d 1396 (7th
Cir. 1993) and Thiel v. State Bar of Wisconsin, 94 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 1996). A contemporary
summary of both sides of the issue is presented in Debate, Voluntary Bar v. Mandatory Bar:
The Debate Heats Up, 64 Wis. LAWYER 10 (Feb. 1991).
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